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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews recent work on the relationship between indus-
trial organization and international trade. Five strands in the theore-
tical literature are discussed. First is the role of economies of scale
as a cause of intra—industry trade, modelled using monopolistic competi-
tion. Second is the effect of tariffs and quotas on domestic market
power. Third is the analysis of dumping as international price discrimi-
nation. Fourth is the potential strategy role of government policy as an
aid to domestic firms in oligopolistic competition. Finally, the paper
discusses recent work that may provide a new argument for protectionism.





Cambridge, MA 02139In retrospect,it seems obvious that the theory of international
trade should draw heavily on models of industrial organization. Most
of world trade is in the products of industries that we have no
hesitation in classifying as oligopolies when we see them in their
domestic aspect. Yet until quite recently only a handful of papers
had attempted to apply models of imperfect competition to
international trade issues. Indeed, in 1974 Richard Caves still felt
that a lecture on the relationship between trade and industrial
organization needed to begin with an apology for the novelty of the
idea.
Only in the last decade have we seen the emergence of a sizeable
literature that links trade theory and industrial organization. This
new literature has two main strands. One is fundamentally concerned
with modelling the role of economies of scale as a cause of trade. To
introduce economies of scale into the model requires that the impact
of increasing returns on market structure be somehow taken into
account, but in this literature the main concern is usually to get the
issue of market structure out of the way as simply as possible —which
turns out to be most easily done by assuming that markets are
characterized by Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. The first
section of this paper summarizes the main insights from this approach.
Since this paper is aimed primarily at an audience of 1—0
researchers rather than trade theorists, however, most of it will be
devoted to the second strand in recent literature, which views
imperfect competition as the core of the story rather than an2
unavoidable nuisance issue raised by the attempt to discuss increasing
returns. Here there are four main themes, each represented by a
section of the paper. First is the relation between trade policy and
the market power of domestic firms. Second is the role of price
discrimination and "dumping" in international markets. Third is the
possibility that government action can serve a "strategic" role in
giving domestic firms an advantage in oligopolistic competition.
Fourth, there is the question of whether industrial organization gives
us new arguments in favor of protectionism. A final section of the
paper will review some recent attempts at quantifying these
theoretical models.
Generality in models of imperfect competition is never easy to
come by, and usually turns out to be illusory in any case.In this
survey I will not even make the attempt. Whatever is necessary for
easy exposition will be assumed: specific functional forms, constant
marginal cost, specific parameters where that helps. And at least one
part of the tradition of international trade theory will be retained:
much of the exposition will be diagrammatic rather than algebraic.
THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION TRADE MODEL
Origins of the model3
The monopolistic competition model of trade began with an
empirical observation: neither the pattern of trade nor its results
seem to accord very well with what traditional trade models would lead
us to expect. The most influential of trade models is the Heckscher—
Oh].in—Samuelson model, which tells us that trade reflects an
interaction between the characteristics of countries and the
characteristics of the production technology of different goods.
Specifically, countries will export goods whose production is
intensive in the factors with which they are abundantly endowed —
e.g.,countries with a high capital—labor ratio will export capital—
intensive goods. This model leads us to expect three things. First,
trade should typically be between complementary countries —capital—
abundant countries should trade with labor-abundant. Second, the
composition of trade should reflect the sources of comparative
advantage. Third, since trade is in effect an indirect way for
countries to trade factors of production, it should have strong
effects on income distribution —whena country trades capital—
intensive exports for labor—intensive imports, its workers should end
up worse of f.
What empirical workers noticed in the 1960s was that trends in
world trade did not seem to accord with these expectations. The
largest and rapidly growing part of world trade was trade among the
industrial countries, which seemed fairly similar in their factor
endowments andwereclearly becoming more similar over time. The4
trade between industrial countries was largely composed of two way
exchanges of fairly similar goods —so—called"intra-industry' trade.
Finally, in several important episodes of rapid growth in trade -
notablyformation of the European Economic Community and the Canadian—
US auto pact -thedistributional effects turned out to be much less
noticeable than had been feared.
From the mid—60s on, a number of researchers proposed a simple
explanation of these observations. Trade among the industrial
countries, they argued, was due not to comparative advantage but to
economies of scale. Because of the scale economies, there was an
essentially arbitrary specialization by similar countries in the
production of different goods, often of goods produced with the same
factor intensities. This explained both why similar countries traded
with each other and why they exchanged similar products. At the same
time, trade based on increasing returns rather than indirect exchange
of factors need not have large income distribution effects. Thus
introducing economies of scale as a determinant of trade seemed to
resolve the puzzles uncovered by empirical work.
The problem, of course, was that at the time there was no good
way to introduce economies of scale into a general equilibrium trade
model. Without being embedded in a formal model, the theory of intra—
industry trade could not become part of mainstream international
economies. The crucial theoretical development thus came in the late
1970s, when new models of monopolistic competition were seen to allow5
a remarkably simple and elegant theory of trade in the presence of
increasing returns. This marriage of indusrial organization and trade
was first proposed independently in papers by Dixit and Norman (1980),
Krugman (1979), and Lancaster (1980). It was further extended by
Helpman (1981), Krugman (1980, 1981), Ethier (1982), and others. Now
that a number of years have gone into distilling the essentials of
this approach, it is possible to describe in very compact form a basic
monopolistic competition model of trade.
The basic model
Consider first a single economy without any foreign trade. We
will suppose that this economy has two factors of production, capital
and labor. These factors are employed in two sectors, Manufactures
and Food.
Food we will take to be a homogeneous product, with a constant
returns technology and thus a perfectly competitive market structure.
Manufactures, however, we assume to consist of many differentiated
products, subject to product—specific economies of scale. There is
assumed to be a suitable choice of units such that all of the
potential products can be made to look symmetric, with identical cost
and demand functions. Further, the set of potential products is
assumed to be sufficiently large, and the individual products
sufficiently small, that there exists a free—entry noncooperative
equilibrium with zero profits.6
Much effect has gone into the precise formulation of product
differentiation. Some authors, including Dixit and Norman (1980),
Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981), and Ethier (1982) follow the Spence (1976)
and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) assumption that all products are demanded by
each individual, and thus build product differentiation into the
utility function. Others including Lancaster (1980) and Helpman
(1981), follow Lancaster's approach in which the demand for variety
arises from diversity of tastes. It turns out that for the purposes
of describing trade it does not matter at all which approach we take.
All we need is the result that equilibrium in the Manufactures sector
involves the production of a large number of differentiated products,
and that all profits are competed away.
Figure 1 represents the endowment of the economy as the sides of
a box. With full employment this endowment will be exhausted by the
resources used in the two sectors. We let OQ be the resources used in
Manfuactures, and QQ* be the resources used in Food. Thus
Manufactures is assumed to be capital—intensive.
Next we want to introduce international trade. As Dixit and
Norman (1980) have shown, this is most simply done not by adding a
second economy, but instead by breaking our first economy up. Let us
imagine that the resources of our original economy are now split
between two countries, Home and Foreign. If we measure Home's
endowment using 0 as origin and Foreign's with 0* as origin, we can
represent the division of the world's resources by a single point such7
as E. By putting E above the diagonal we have assumed that Home is
capital—abundant, Foreign labor—abundant.
What can we now say about the world's production? The answer is
that as long as the resources are not divided too unequally —
specifically,as long as E lies inside the parallelogram OQO*Q* -
aggregateworld production will not change. We can determine the
allocation of that production between the countries by completing
parallelograms. Thus Home will devote resources °M to Manufactures,
to Food; Foreign will devote O*P and O*PZ to Manufactures and
Food respectively.
Now it is immediately apparent that a redistribution of resources
from one country to another will have a strongly biased effect on the
distribution of world production. Suppose, for example, that Home
were to have more capital and Foreign loss. Then it is clear that
Home would produce more Manufactures and less Food —afamiliar result
for trade theorists. It follows, given identical demand patterns,
that capital—abundant Home will be a net exporter of Manufactures and
a net importer of Food. Thus at the level of interindustry trade
flows conventional comparative advantage continues to apply.
Where economies of scale and monopolistic competition enter the
story is in intra—industry specialization. When production of
Manufactures is split between Home and Foreign, economies of scale
will imply that output of each individual differentiated product is
concentrated in one country or the other. Which country produces8
which products is indeterminate, but the important point is that
within the Manufactures sector each country will be producing a
different set of goods. Since each country is assumed to have diverse
demand, the result will be that even a country that is a net exporter
of Manufactures will still demand some imports of the manufactures
produced abroad.
The resulting pattern of trade is illustrated in Figure 2. There
will be two—way intraindustry" trade within the manufacturing sector,
as well as conventional interindustry trade. The former will in
effect reflect scale economies and product differentiation, while the
latter reflects comparative advantage. We can notice two points about
this pattern of trade. First, even if the countries had identical
resource mixes (i.e., if point E in Figure 1 were on the diagonal)
there will still be trade in Manufactures, because of intra—industry
specialization. Second, the more similar the countries are in their
factor endowments, the more they will engage in intra- as opposed to
inter— industry trade.
Extensions of the model
A number of authors have applied the monopolistic competition
approach to models that attempt to capture more complex insights than
the one we have just described. Many of these extensions are treated
in Helpman and Krugman (1985); here I describe a few of the extensions
briefly.9
Intermediate goods: Ethier (1982) has emphasized that much
intraindustry trade is in reality in intermediate goods. Models that
reflect this are Ethier (1982), Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985, ch. 11). As it turns out, this extension makes little
difference.
Nontraded goods: Helpman and Razin (1984) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985, ch. 10) introduce nontraded goods into the model.
Again, this doesn't make much difference. The major new implication
is that differences in the size of national markets can give rise to
new incentives for factor mobility.
Market size effects: Krugman (1980), Helpman and Krugman (1985),
and Venables (1985b) develop models in which transport costs make the
size of the domestic market an important determinant of trade.
Specifically, countries tend other things equal to export the products
of industries for which they have large domestic markets.
Multinational firms: Helpman (1985) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985) develop models in which it is assumed that economies of scope
and/or vertical integration lead to the emergence of multi—activity
firms. Within the monopolistic competition framework it is then
possible to let comparative advantage determine the location of
activities, allowing models that describe both trade and the extent of
multinational enterprise. Horstmann and Markusen ( ) havefurther
extended the analysis with a model that describes the dynamics by
which firms may move from an initial strategy of exporting to a later
stage of direct foreign investment.10
Alternative market structures: Helpman and Krugman contains some
efforts to extend the insights of the monopolistic competition model
beyond the highly special Chamberlinian large—group market structure.
The insights survive essentially intact when the structure is instead
assumed to be one of contestable markets" in the manner of Baumol,
Panzar, and Willig (1982). (Helpman and Krugman ch. 4). A much more
qualified set of results occurs when the structure is instead assumed
to be one of small—group oligopoly.(Chs. 5 and 7).
Evaluation
The monopolistic competition model has had a major impact on
research into international trade. By showing that increasing returns
and imperfect competition can make a fundamental difference to the way
we think about trade, this approach was crucial in making work that
applies industrial organization concepts to trade respectable. In
effect, the monopolistic competition model was the thin end of the 1—0
/trade wedge.
From the point of view of I—C theorists, however, the
monopolistic competition trade model may be the least interesting part
of the new trade theory. In essence, theorists in this area have
viewed imperfect competition as a nuisance variable in a story that is
fundamentally about increasing returns. Thus the theory has little to
teach us about industrial organization itself. By contrast, the other11
strand of the new trade theory is interested in increasing returns
primarily as a cause of imperfect competition, and it is this
imperfect competition that is the main story. Thus it is this second
strand which will occupy the rest of this survey.
PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC MARKET POWER
Many economists have noted that international trade reduces the
market power of domestic firms, and argued that conversely protection
increases domestic market power. The interest of trade theorists has
been centered on two extensions of this argument. First is the
proposition that the effects of protection depend on the form it takes
—specifically,that quantitative restrictions such as import quotas
create more domestic market power than tariffs. This proposition was
first demonstrated by Bhagwati (1967) in a model in which a domestic
monopolist faces competitive foreign suppliers; only with recent work
by Krishna (1984) has the analysis been extended to the case where
both domestic and foreign firms are large agents. More recently
still., Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) have argued that when collusive
behavior is backed by the threat of a breakdown of that collusion,
import quotas may actually perversely increase competition.
The second proposition is that protection, by initially
generating monopoly rents, generates excessive entry and thus leads to12
inefficiently small scale production. This proposition, originally
proposed by Eastman and Stykolt (1960), is backed by substantial
evidence, and has been modelled by Dixit and Norman (1980).
Bhagwatis model
Consider an industry in which one firm has a monopoly on domestic
production, but is subject to competition from price-taking foreign
suppliers. Why the domestic market structure should differ from that
in the rest of the world is left unexplained; presumably there are
unspecified economies of scale that are large relative to the domestic
market but not relative to the world market. Although economies of
scale may explain the existence of the monopoly, however, the marginal
cost curve is assumed to slope upward. Foreign supply is assumed for
simplicity to be perfectly elastic (this differs slightly from
Bhagwati, who allowed for upward—sloping foreign supply; nothing
crucial hinges on the difference. Also, Corden (1967) analyzed the
case when domestic marginal cost is downward sloping. In this case any
tariff sufficient to establish the domestic firm also eliminates
imports).
Figure 3 can be used to analyze the effects of tariffs in this
model. In the figure, D is the domestic demand curve facing the
monopolist, MC the monopolist's marginal cost curve. w is the world
price, i.e., the price at which imports are supplied to the domestic13
market. is the price that would obtain if all domestic demand were
supplied by the monopolist but the monopolist were to behave as a
price taker. m is the price the monopolist would charge if there
were no import competition.
Consider first the case of free trade. The domestic firm cannot
raise the price above so the profit—maximizing strategy is to set
marginal cost equal to P, producing Q0.In this case the monopolist
has no monopoly power.
Now suppose the government imposes a tariff. The effect is to
raise the price at which imports will come into the market. As long
as the tariff—inclusive import price lies between and however,
it remains true that the domestic firm acts like a price—taker,
setting output where price equals marginal cost.
In a competitive industry, a tariff that raised the import price
to would be prohibitive, and any increase in the tariff beyond that
level would have no effect —therewould be "water in the tariff."
Here the monopoly position of the domestic firm matters. A tariff
that raises the price above allows the firm to raise its own price
to the same level, something that will be profitable as long as the
tariff price is below P. That is, even when no imports actually
occur, the threat of imports keeps the monopolist from exercising its
monopoly power fully, and raising an already prohibitive tariff
therefore leads to domestic price increases. It also follows that
such tariff increases actually reduce domestic output.14
Now consider the effects of an import quota. In perfectly
competitive models a quota is equivalent in its effects to a tariff
that limits imports to the same level. Once we have domestic market
power, however, an important difference emerges. A monopolist
protected by a tariff cannot raise its price above the tariff -
inclusiveimport price without losing the domestic market to imports.
By contrast, a firm sheltered by quantitative restrictions need not
fear increased imports, and is free to exercise its market power. The
result is that an import quota will lead to a higher domestic price
and lower domestic output than an "equivalent" tariff, defined as a
tariff that leads to the same level of imports.
Figure 4 illustrates the non—equivalence of tariffs and quotas.
As before, D is the domestic demand curve, MC marginal cost, P the
world price. We compare a tariff t that reduces imports to I, and
an import quota that restricts imports to the same level.
With a tariff, the domestic firm simply sets marginal cost equal
to With the equivalent quota, however, the firm now face the
demand curve D1, derived by subtracting Tfromthe domestic demand
curve D. Corresponding to is a marginal revenue curve MR1. The
profit—maximizing price with the quota is therefore PQ; the quota
leads to a higher price and lower output than the tariff.
Bhagwati's model produces a clear and compelling result. Better
still, it yields a clear policy message: if you must protect, use a
tariff rather than a quota. There are, however, two troubling15
features of the model. One is the asymmetry between domestic and
foreign firms; we would like foreigners also to be modelled as
imperfectly competitive. The other is the lack of any model of the
process of entry that leads to imperfect Competition. Both features
have been the subject of recent research, the first most notably by
Krishna (1984), the second by Dixit and Norman (1980).
Krishna's model
To get away from an arbitrary asymmetry between a domestic
monopolist and price—taking foreign firms, it seems natural to examine
a duopoly. We can let there be a single domestic firm that supplies
the market with local production, and a single foreign firm that
exports to the market. Collusion is of course possible, but as a
modelling device we would prefer to assume noncomparative behavior.
(For some possible implications of collusion, however, see below).
In modelling noncooperative oligopolies, the choice of strategy
variables is crucial. The two main alternatives are of course the
Cournot approach, in which firms take each others' outputs as given,
and the Bertrand approach, in which prices are taken as given. In
analyzing the effects of protection, both approaches turn out to be
problematic. The Cournot assumption fails to capture Bhagwati's
insight regarding the difference between quotas and tariffs; the
Bertrand assumption fails to yield a pure strategy equilibrium.16
The problem with the Cournot approach may be simply stated.
Bhagwatis model argued that a quota creates more market power than a
tariff because the domestic firm knows that an increase in its price
will lead to an increase in imports. In the Cournot approach,
however, the domestic firm is assumed to take the level of imports as
given in any case; so a quota and a tariff that leads to the same
level of imports once again have equivalent effects on the domestic
firms behavior.
If Bhagwati's argument for a lack of equivalence between tariffs
and quotas is right, however —andmost international economists feel
that it is —thenthis approach is missing an important insight. The
alternative is a Rsrtrand approach. What Krishna shows is that this
leads to unexpected complexities.
Krishna considers a market in which a domestic and foreign firm
produce imperfect substitutes (an assumption that is necessary if
Bertrand competition is not to collapse to marginal cost pricing). In
the absence of quantitative trade restrictions, that is, either under
free trade or with a tariff, Bertrand competition can be treated in a
straightforward fashion. Each firm determines a profit—maximizing
price given the other firms price; given reasonable restrictions, we
can draw two upward—sloping reaction functions whose intersection
determines equilibrium.
But suppose that an import quota is imposed. This creates an
immediate conceptual problem, which in turn leads to a problem in the
understanding of equilibrium.17
The conceptual problem is how to handle the possibility of excess
demand. Suppose that at the prices set by the domestic and foreign
firms, domestic consumers demand more foreign goods than the import
quota allows. What happens? Krishna assumes, plausibly, that an
unspecified group of middlemen collects the difference between the
price charged by the foreign firm and the market—clearing consumer
price. That is, incipient excess demand is reflected in an increased
"dealer markup' rather than in rationing.
This now raises the next question, which is how to interpret
Bertrand competition in this case. Which price does the domestic firm
take as given, the foreign factory price or the dealer price? Here
Krishna assumes, again sensibly, that the domestic firm takes the
foreign factory price rather than the dealer price as given. This
means that the domestic firm recognizes its ability to affect the
consumer price of foreign substitutes when the import quota is
binding.
But this seemingly innocuous assumption turns out to imply a
basic discontinuity in the domestic firms response function. The
domestic firm in effect has two discrete pricing options: an
"aggressive" option of charging a low price that limits imports to
less than the quota, or a "timid" option of retreating behind the
quota and charging a high price. A small rise in the foreign firm's
price can shift the domestic firm's optimal response from "timid" to
"aggressive.".18
Figure 5 illustrates the point.It shows the demand curve and
the associated marginal revenue curve facing the domestic firm for a
given foreign firm factory price. The price p is the price at which
the quota becomes binding. That is, at domestic firm price above
there is an incipient excess demand for imports, which is reflected in
dealer markups that the domestic firm knows it can affect. By
Contrast, at prices below p the dealer price of imports is taken as
given. That is, at prices belowthe domestic firm takes the
prices of the imported substitute as given, while at prices above
it believes that increases in its own price will increase the prices
of the substitutes as well. The result is a discontinuity in the
slope of the perceived demand curve, which is steeper just above
than it is just below; and hence a discontinuity in the level of the
marginal revenue curve, which jumps up at the quantity corresponding
to.
What is clear from the figure is that there are two locally
profit—maximizing domestic prices: the 'timid" maximum T' and the
"aggressive" maximum Which maximum is global depends on the price
charged by the foreign firm. The profitability of the timid option
is unaffected by what the foreign firm does, but the higher the
foreign price, the more profitable the aggressive option.
The result is a home reaction function looking like HH in Figure
6. At low levels of the foreign price p, the domestic firm retreats
behind the quota and therefore chooses a price locally independent of19
p* At a sufficiently high p*, however, the domestic firm abruptly
sallies out from behind the quota with a cut in its price.
The foreign best response function FF has no such discontinuity.
However, if the quota matters at all, FF must, as shown, pass right
through the hole in HH! Thus no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
A mixed strategy equilibrium does exist.If the foreign firm
charges p, the home firm is indifferent between T and by
randomizing its choice of A and T with the right probabilities, the
home firm can induce its competitor to choose p.
In this mixed strategy equilibrium, we notice that the foreign
firm, despite its monopoly power, does not always raise its price
enough to capture all of the quota rents, a result in contrast to
conventional wisdom. We can also note that with some probability the
quota will fail to be binding, in the sense that imports are strictly
less than the quota --yetboth domestic and foreign prices are
unambiguously higher even in this case than under free trade.
A point stressed by Krishna is that in this duopoly case a quota
can easily raise the profits of both firms. Consider for example a
quota that only restricts imports not to exceed their free trade
level. Clearly if the domestic firm charges T' it is because this is
more profitable than the free trade price, while the foreign firm will
sell the same output as under free trade, yet at a higher price. On
the other hand, if the domestic firm charges A' this aggressive"
price is still above the free trade price, so the foreign firm must be20
earning higher profits. (The domestic firm of course earns the same in
both states). So profitability of both firms increases unambiguously.
Protection vs. collusion
Almost all theoretical work on industrial organization/trade
issues assumes that firms act noncooperatively. In industrial
organization theory itself, however, there has recently been a drift
toward taking the possibility of collusive behavior more seriously.
Key to this drift has been the recognition that collusive behavior may
be individually rational in an indefinitely repeated game, where each
player believes that his failure to play cooperatively today will lead
to noncooperative behavior by others tomorrow. The influential
experimental work of Axelrod (1983) suggests that reasonable
strategies by individuals will indeed lead to cooperative outcomes in
a variety of circumstances.
Recently Davidson (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) have
proposed analyses of the effects of protection on collusion that seem
to stand Bhagwati on his head. They argue that precisely because
protection tends to raise profitability in the absence of collusion,
it reduces the penalty for cheating on a collusive agreement. By thus
reducing the prospects for collusion, the protection actually
increases competition.21
The case is clearest for an import quota, analyzed by Rotemberg
and Saloner. To understand their argument, consider Krishna's model
again, but now suppose that the two firms attempt to agree on prices
higher than the noncooperative level. Suppose also that the only
enforcement mechanism for their agreement is the belief of each firm
that if it cheats this period, the other firm will thenceforth play
noncooperatively. Then collusion will succeed only if the extra
profits gained by cheating now are more than offset by the present
discounted value of the profits that will subsequently be lost by the
collapse of collusion. A viable price—fixing agreement must therefore
set prices low enough to make cheating unappealing.
But as we saw in our discussion of Krishna's model, a quota can
actually raise the profitability of both firms in noncooperative
equilibrium. This paradoxically makes collusion more difficult to
sustain, by reducing the penalty for cheating. If the firms manage to
collude nonetheless, they may be forced to agree on lower prices in
order to make their collusion sustainable. So in this case an import
quota actually leads to more competition and lower prices than free
trade!
Davidson considers the case of a tariff, which raises the
noncooperative profits of the domestic firm but lowers that of the
foreign competitor. If the result is to encourage the domestic firm to
cheat, the tariff will likewise increase competition.22
It remains to be seen whether this argument will shake the
orthodox presumption that protection is bad for competition. The
modelling of collusive behavior is still in its infancy. To me, at
least, the approach taken in this new line of work seems an odd mix of
ad—hoc assumptions about retaliation with hyper-rational calculations
by firms about the consequences of such retaliation. Yet the argument
is profoundly unsetttling, which means that it must be valuable
(though not that it must be right!).
Protection and excessive entry
In the 1950s, during the honeymoon period of import—substituting
industrialization strategies, it was often argued that economies of
scale in production provided an argument for protection ——aview with
a lineage going back to Frank Graham. At first, the point seems
obvious: protection raises the sales of domestic firms, and thus
allows them to slide down their average cost curves. In an influential
paper, however, Eastman and Stykolt (1960) argued that often the
reverse is true. In their view, bolstered by an appeal to Canadian
experience, protection typically leads to a smaller scale of
production and thus reduced efficiency.
The Eastman—Stykolt view was not couched in terms of an explicit
model. Basically, however, they considered the typical case to be that
where the number of firms permitted by economies of scale is more than23
one but small enough to allow effective collusion. Such a collusive
industry will seek to raise its price to monopoly levels unless
constrained by foreign competition. A tariff or quota will thus lead
initially to higher prices and profits. The long run result, however,
will be entry of new firms into the industry. If integer constraints
do not bind too much, this entry will eliminate profits by driving
scale down and average cost up. Thus the effect of protection is to
create a proliferation of inefficiently small producers. Such
proliferation is indeed one of the favorite horror stories of Critics
of protection in less—developed countries, with the history of the
Latin American auto industry the classic case.
This original version of the inefficient entry problem depended
on the assumption of collusion among domestic producers. The problem
could however arise even with noncooperative behavior, as is clear
from a model offered by Dixit and Norman (1980). They show that ina
Cournot market with free entry, expanding the size of the market leads
to a less than proportional increase in the number of firms, and toa
fall in average cost. Since international trade in effect links
together national markets into a larger world market, it would
presumably have the same result. Protection, on the other hand,
fragments the world market and hence leads to a proliferation of firms
and a rise in Costs.
We will return to the inefficient entry problem below. It playsa
key role in the debate over "strategic" trade policy, and is also
central to some attempts to quantify the effects of trade policy.24
Evaluation
The basic Bhagwati model of protection and market power is
admirably clear and simple, and has been in circulation for long
enough to have percolated into practical policy analysis. Market power
analysis along Bhagwatis lines has become part of the book of
analytical recipes used by the International Trade Commission
(Rousslang and Suomela 1985). Market power considerations have now and
then helped dictate the form taken by protection; for example, the
trigger price mechanism on steel during the Carter administration was
deliberately designed to minimize the effect of protection on the
monopoly power of both domestic and foreign firms. And perceptions of
the impact of trade policy on market power seem to be playing a role
in antitrust decisions: in the steel industry, for example, it appears
that the Justice Department appreciates that foreign competition is
less effective a discipline than import penetration would suggest
thanks to import quotas and voluntary export restraints.
More sophisticated models have yet to find application. It is at
this point hard to see how Krishnas model might be made operational,
let alone the inverted logic of the collusion models. The one
exception is the excess entry story, which as we will see is the
central element in Harris and Cox's (198?) effort to quantify the
effect of protection on Canadas economy.25
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND DUMPING
The phenomenon of "dumping" —sellingexports at less than the
domestic price —haslong been a major concern of trade legislation.
It is also self-evidently an imperfect competition issue. It is
therefore not surprising that the new literature on trade and 1—0
sheds some further light on dumping as a particular case of price
discrimination. More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that the new
literature on dumping actually identifies a new explanation of
international trade, distinct from both comparative advantage and
economies of scale.
Much as in the case of protection and market power, the initial
insight here comes from an asymmetric model in which a domestic
monopolist confronts price—taking foreign firms. This insight becomes
both enlarged and transformed when rival oligopolists are introduced.
Finally, the welfare effects of trade based on dumping are of some
interest.
An asymmetric model
An extremely simple model of dumping is presented by Caves and
Jones (1985) and illustrated in Figure 7. As in the case of26
protection and market power, a single domestic monopolist is assumed
to face a given world price P. We now, however, reverse the
assumptions about the possibilities for trade. Before, we let the
firm face import competition while disregarding the possibility of
exports. Now we assume that the domestic market is somehow closed to
imports, while allowing the domestic firm to export.
In the figure I have drawn a particular case, where with a price—
taking domestic firm there would be neither imports nor exports. If
the domestic firm acts as a monopolist, however, it will want to set
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost in both the domestic and the
foreign markets. Marginal revenue on the foreign market is however
just p, so the profit—maximizing solution is the one illustrated.
The firm sets a domestic price above yet it exports, "dumping" on
the world market where additional sales do not depress the price
received on inframarginal units.
Three points should be noted about this example. The first is
that while for simplicity it has been assumed that p is given, this
is not essential. What is important is that the firm perceives itself
as facing a higher elasticity of demand on exports than on domestic
sales. That is, dumping is simply international price discrimination.
Second, the figure illustrates a case in which a price—taking
domestic firm would not export -inthe usual sense of the term, the
domestic industry has neither a comparative advantage nor a
comparative disadvantage. Yet the firm does in fact export. Clearly27
we could have an industry which has at least some comparative
disadvantage, and yet dumps in the export market. In other words,
dumping can make trade run "uphill" against conventional determinants
of its direction.
Third, the difference between the domestic and foreign markets
remains unexplained. Why should the domestic firm be a price—setter
at home, a price—taker abroad (or more generally, face more elastic
demand for exports)? We would like to have a model in which this
asymmetry is derived, rather than built in by assumption. In the new
1—0 trade literature, such models have finaly emerged.
Brander's model
A duopoly model of dumping was developed by Brander (1981) and
elaborated on by Brander and Krugman (1983). This model goes to the
opposite extreme from the asymmetrical model we just described, by
postulating instead a perfectly symmetrical situation. We assume that
some good is consumed in two countries, each of which has the same
demand; and we assume that there is a single firm in each country, and
that the two firms have identical costs. There is some positive cost
of transporting the good internationally, so that in a perfect
competition setting there would be no trade.
If the transport costs are not too large, however, and if the
firms behave in a Cournot fashion, trade will nevertheless result. To28
see why, consider Figure 8, which illustrates what would happen in the
absence of trade. We see each firm acting as a monopolist, and thus
each country having a price that exceeds marginal costs. The firms do
not expand their output, however, because this would depress the price
on iriframarginal units.
But suppose that the markup over marginal cost exceeds the
transport cost between the markets. In this case each firm will have
an incentive to absorb the transport cost so as to export to the
other's home market. The reason is that an extra unit sold abroad,
even though it yields a price net of transportation less than a unit
sold domestically, does not depress the price of inframarginal sales
(it depresses the price the other firm receives instead). So as long
as price less transportation exceeds marginal cost, it is worth
exporting.
The result is a mutual interpenetration of markets, described by
Brander and Krugman as "reciprocal dumping." With Cournot behavior,
equilibrium will take the following form: each firm will have a
larger share of its home market than the foreign market, and will thus
perceive itself as facing a higher elasticity of demand abroad than at
home. The difference in perceived elasticity of demand will be just
enough to induce firms to absorb transport costs. The result will
therefore be a determinate volume of "cross—hauling": two—way trade
in the same product. In the symmetric example considered, this
pointless trade will be balanced.29
From a trade theorist's point of view, this result is startling:
here we have international trade occurring despite a complete absence
of comparative advantage and without even any direct role for
economies of scale (although an indirect role can be introduced if we
suppose that increasing returns is the explanation of oligopoly).
From an industrial organization point of view, the result may not seem
quite so outlandish, since it bears a family resemblance to the theory
of basing—point pricing (Smithies 1942). Nonetheless, the trade—
theorist's approach offers the new possibility of an explicit welfare
analysis.
Reciprocal dumping and welfare
Reciprocal dumping is a totally pointless form of trade —the
same good is shipped in both directions, and real resources are wasted
in its transportation. Nonetheless, the trade is not necessarily
harmful. International competition reduces the monopoly distortion in
each market, and the pro—competitive effect can outweigh the resource
waste.
The welfare effects of reciprocal dumping are illustrated in
Figure 9. Since the countries are assumed to be symmetric, looking at
only one market will do. We note two effects. First, some of the
exports that are dumped in each country are a net addition to
consumption. In the figure this is represented as an increase of30
total deliveries from an initial level z to the level x+y. Since the
initial price A exceeds marginal cost c plus transportation cost t,
this represents a net gain, and can be equated with the pro—
competitive effect. On the other side, some of the imports displace
domestic production for the domestic market. This is represented as a
fall of deliveries from the domestic firm to its own market from z to
x, with the quantity y both imported and exported. Since this involves
a waste of resources on transportation, this constitutes a loss. From
the diagram it seems impossible to tell whether the net effect is a
gain or a loss.
We know, however, that in one case at least there must be a gain.
If transport costs are zero, cross—hauling may be pointless but it is
also costless,and the pro—competitive effect yields gains. Presumably
this remains true for transport costs sufficiently low.
This suggests that we examine how welfare changes as we vary
transport costs. Consider the effects of a small reduction in
transport costs, illustrated in Figure 10. There will be three
effects. First, there will be a direct reduction in the cost of
transporting the initial level of shipments —aclear gain. Second,
there will be an increase in consumption, which will be a gain to the
extent that the initial price exceeds marginal cost plus
transportation cost. Third, there will be a displacement of local
production by imports, which will be a loss by the change times the
initial transport cost.31
Can we sign the total effect? We can do so in two cases. First,
suppose that transport costs are near zero. Then the last effect is
negligible, and a reduction in transport is clearly beneficial.
More interestingly, suppose that initially transport costs are
almost large enough to prohibit trade. Recalling our discussion
above, this will be a situation where price is only slightly above
marginal cost plus transport, and where the volume of trade is very
small. This means that when transport costs are near the prohibitive
level, the two sources of gain from a small decline in these costs
become negligible, and a decline in transport costs thus reduces
welfare.
Putting these results together, what we see is the relationship
illustrated in Figure 11.If transport costs are high, but not high
enough to prevent trade, trade based solely on dumping leads to
losses. If they are low, trade is beneficial.
Evaluation
The new literature on dumping has so far been resolutely non-
policy and non—empirical. Still, nothing that suggests a previously
unsuspected explanation of international trade can be dismissed as
without importance. Furthermore, the modelling techniques developed in
the dumping literature are beginning to find at least some
application. As we will see, attempts to calibrate models to actual32
data have so far relied on assumptions that bear a clear family
resemblanceto those introduced by Brander and Brander and Krugman.
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY
One of the most controversial ideas of the new 1—0/trade
literature has been the suggestion that government intervention can
raise national welfare by shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to
domestic firms. The starting point of this debate was several papers
by Brander and Spencer (1983,1985), who showed that in principle
government policies such as export subsidies can serve the same
purpose as, for example, investment in excess capacity in the 1—0
literature on entry deterrence. That is, government policies can serve
the "strategic" purpose of altering the subsequent incentives of
firms, acting as a deterrent to foreign competitors. The "strategic"
analysis seems to offer a possible rationale for trade policies, such
as export subsidies, that have been almost universally condemned by
international economists in the past.
The Brander-Spencer analysis, coming at a time of heated debate
over US international competitiveness, appears dangerously topical,
and other economists have been quick to challenge the robustness of
their results. The critiques are themselves of considerable analytic
interest. In this survey I consider four important lines of research33
suggested by the critique of Brander—Spencer strategic trade policy.
First is the dependence of trade policy recommendations on the nature
of competition between firms, analyzed by Eaton and Grossman (1984).
Second is the general equilibrium issue raised by the fact that
industries must compete for resources within a country, analyzed by
Dixit and Grossman (1984). Third is the question of entry, studied by
Horstmann and Markusen (1986) and Dixit (1986). Finally is the
question of who is behaving strategically with respect to whom,
analyzed by Dixit and Kyle (1985).
The Brander—Spencer analysis
As is often the case in the 10/trade literature, the initial
insight in strategic trade policy was obtained by subtraction rather
than addition; by simplifying a trade issue to a form where a familiar
model of imperfect competition can be easily applied.
Consider an industry in which there are only two firms, each in
one country. The clever simplification that Spencer and Brander
suggest is to assume that neither country has any domestic demand for
the industry's products. Instead, both countries export to a third
market. Also, distortions other than the presence of monopoly power in
this industry are ruled out ——i.e.,the marginal cost of each firm is
also the social cost of the resources it uses. The result is that for34
each country national welfare can be identified with the profits
earned by its firm.
Since the firms are themselves attempting to maximize profits,
one might imagine that there is no case for government intervention.
However, this is not necessarily the case. To see why, we assume for
now that the two firms compete in Cournot fashion, and illustrate
their competition with Figure 12.
Each firm's reaction function will, for reasonable restrictions
on cost and demand, slope down, and the Home firm's reaction function
will be steeper than its competitor's. Point N is the Nash
equilibrium. Drawn through point N is one of the Home firm's iso—
prof it curves. Given that the reaction function is constructed by
maximizing Home's profits at each level of Foreign output, the iso—
profit curve is flat at point N.
Now it is apparent that the Home firm could do better than at
point N if it could only somehow commit itself to produce more than
its Cournot output. Indeed, if the Home firm could pre—commit itself
to any level of output, while knowing that the Foreign firm would
revise its own plans optimally, the Outcome could be driven to the
Stackleberg point S. The problem is that there is no good reason to
assign the leadership role to either firm. If no waytoestablish a
commitment exists, the Nash outcome is what will emerge.
What Spencer and Brander pointed out was that a government policy
could serve the purpose of making a commitment credible. Suppose that35
the Home government establishes an export subsidy for this industry.
This subsidy will shift the Home reaction function to the right, and
thus the outcome will shift southeast along the Foreign reaction
function. Because the subsidy has the deterrent effect of reducing
Foreign exports, the profits of the Home firm will rise by more than
the amount of the subsidy. Thus Home national income will rise. The
optimal export subsidy is of course one that shifts the reaction
function out just enough to achieve the Stackleberg point S.
It is possible to elaborate considerably on this basic model.
Most notably, we can imagine a multi-stage competitive process, in
which firms themselves attempt to establish commitments through
investment in capital or R&D. In these models, considered in Brander
and Spencer (1983), optimal policies typically involve subsidies to
investment as well as exports. The basic point remains the same,
however. Government policy "works" in these models for the same reason
that investing in excess capacity works in entry deterrence models,
because it alters the subsequent game in a way that benefits the
domestic firm.
The nature of competition
Eaton and Grossman (1984) have argued forcefully that the
argument f or strategic trade policy is of limited use, because the
particular policy recommendation depends critically on details of the36
model. In particular, they show that the Brander—Spencer case for
export subsidies depends on the assumption of Cournot competition.
With other assumptions, the result may go away or even be reversed.
To see this, suppose instead that we have Bertrand competition,
with firms taking each others' prices as given. (As in our discussion
of import quotas above, we must assume the the two firms are producing
differentiated products if the model is not to collapse to perfect
competition). Then the reaction function diagram must be drawn in
price space.
Figure 13 shows the essentials. Each firm's best responses
describe a reaction function that is upward—sloping. With reasonable
restrictions, Home's curve is steeper than Foreign's. The Nash
equilibrium is at N, and the Home iso—profit curve passing through N
is flat at that point.
The crucial point is that now Home can increase its profits only
by moving northeast along the Foreign reaction function. That is, it
must persuade Foreign to charge a higher price than at the Nash
equilibrium. To do this, it must commit to a higher price than will ex
post be optimal. To achieve this, what the government must do is
impose, not an export subsidy, but an export tax!
So what Eaton and Grossman show is that replacing the Cournot
with a Bertrand assumption reverses the policy recommendation. Given
the shakiness of any characterization of oligopoly behavior, this is
not reassuring.37
Eaton and Grossman go further by embedding both Cournot and
Bertrand in a general conjectural variations formulation. The result
is of course that anything can happen. One case that these authors
emphasize is that of 'rational" conjectures, where the conjectures
actually match the slope of the reaction functions (a case that I do
not find particularly interesting, given the problems of the
conjectural variation approach in general). In this case, not too
surprisingly, free trade turns out to be the optimal policy.
Competition for resources
Dixit and Grossman (1984) offer a further critique of the case
for strategic trade policy based on the partial equilibrium character
of the models. Their point may be made as follows: an export subsidy
works in the Brander —Spencermodel essentially by lowering the
marginal cost faced by the domestic exporter. Foreign firms, seeing
this reduced marginal cost, are deterred from exporting as much as
they otherwise would have, and this is what leads to a shifting of
profits. But in general equilibrium, an export industry can expand
only by bidding resources away from other domestic industries. An
export subsidy, while it lowers marginal cost in the targeted
industry, will therefore raise marginal cost in other sectors. Thus in
industries that are not targeted the effect will be the reverse of
deterrence.38
Dixit arid Grossman construct a particular tractable example where
a group of industries must compete for a single common factor,
"scientists'. An export subsidy to one of these sectors necessarily
forces a contraction in all the others. As we might expect, such a
subsidy raises national income only if the deterrent effect on foreign
competition is higher in the subsidized sector than in the sectors
that are crowded out. As the authors show, to evaluate the
desirability of a subsidy now requires detailed knowledge not only of
the industry in question but of all the industries with which it
competes for resources. Their conclusion is that the likelihood that
sufficient information will be available is small.
Entry
The strategic trade policy argument hinges on the presence of
supernormal profits over which countries can compete. Yet one might
expect that the possibility of entry will limit and perhaps eliminate
these profits. If so, then even in oligopolistic industries the bone
of Contention may be too small to matter.
Horstmann and Markusen (1986) have analyzed the Brander-Spencer
argument when there is free entry by firms. The number of firms in
equilibrium is limited by fixed costs, but they abstract from the
integer problem. The result of allowing entry is to restore the
orthodox argument against export subsidy, in a strong form: all of a39
subsidy is absorbed either by reduced scale or worsened terms of
trade, and thus constitutes a loss from the point of view of the
subsidizing country.
Dixit (1986) is concerned with a more dynamic version of the same
problem. He notes that in industries characterized by technological
uncertainty, there will be winners and losers. The winners —-whowill
actually make up the industry ——willappear to earn supernormal
profits, but this will not really indicate the presence of excess
returns. Ex ante, an investment, say in R&D, may be either a winner or
a loser, so that the costs of those who did not make it should also be
counted. Dixit develops a technology race model of international
competition in a single industry, and shows that in such an industry
high profits among the winners of the race do not offer the
possibility of successful strategic trade policy.
A larger game?
The Brander-Spencer analysis assumes that the government in
effect can commit itself to a trade policy before firms make their
decisions. They also leave aside the possible reactions of foreign
governments. Yet a realistic analysis would surely recognize that
firms also make strategic moves designed to affect government
decisions, and that governments must contend with the possibility of
foreign reactions. Many of the ramifications of these larger games
have been explored by Dixit and Kyle (1985).40
To see what difference this extension makes, consider two cases.
First, suppose that there is a firm that faces the following
situation: it can commit itself to produce by making an irreversible
investment. Once this cost is sunk, it will be socially optimal to
provide the Brander—Spencer export subsidy, and with this subsidy the
firm will find that its entry was justified. From a social point of
view, however, it would have been preferable for the firm not to have
entered at all.
In this case, what is clear is that if the firm can move first,
the government will find itself obliged to provide the subsidy. Yet it
would have been better off if it could have committed itself not to
provide the subsidy, and thus deterred the undesirable entry. The
possibility of an export subsidy, though it raises welfare given
entry, in the end is counterproductive. The government would have been
better off if it had never heard of Brander and Spencer, or had a
constitutional prohibition against listening to them.
Alternatively, consider the case of two countries, both able to
pursue Brander—Spencer policies. It is certainly possible that both
countries may be worse off as the result of a subsidy war, yet they
will find themselves trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.
The point of the extended game analysis, then, is that even
though interventionist policies may be shown to be locally desirable,
it may still be in the country's interest that the use of such
policies be ruled out.41
Evaluation
Strategic trade policy is without doubt a clever insight. From
the beginning, however, it has been clear that the attention received
by that insight has been driven by forces beyond the idea's
intellectual importance. The simple fact is that there is a huge
external market for challenges to the orthodoxy of free trade. Any
intellectually respectable case for interventionist trade policies,
however honestly proposed ——andthe honesty of Brander and Spencer is
not in question ——willquickly find support for the wrong reasons. At
the same time, the profession of international economics has a well
developed immune system designed precisely to cope with these outside
pressures. This immune system takes the form of an immediate intensely
critical scrutiny of any idea that seems to favor protectionism. So
Brander—Spencer attracted both more attention and more critical review
than would normally have been the case.
That said, does the marriage of trade and 1—0 offer an important
new case for protectionism? To answer this we must go beyond the
Brander—Spencer analysis of export competition to consider a wider
range of models.
A NEW CASE FOR PROTECTION?42
To the extent that the 1-0/trade linkage offers any new comfort
to protectionists, it takes the form of four not wholly distinct
arguments. First is the possibility that trade policy can be used to
extract rent from foreign monopolists. Second is the potential for
shifting rent from foreign to domestic firms. Third is the possible
use of protectionist policies as a way to get firms further down their
average cost curves. Last is the use of protection to promote
additional entry, where this is desirable.
Extracting rent from foreigners
The possibility of using a tariff to extract gains from a foreign
monopolist has been emphasized in two papers by Brander and Spencer
(1981,1984). In its simplest version, their analysis considers a
foreign monopolist selling to the domestic market without any domestic
competition. They point out that under a variety of circumstances a
tariff will be partly absorbed by the foreign firm rather than passed
on to domestic consumers. For example, suppose that demand is linear
and that a specific tariff is imposed: then only half of the tariff
will be passed on in prices, with the rest coming out of the firm's
markup.
This observation suggests a terms—of—trade justification for
tariffs similar to the traditional optimum tariff argument. The
difference is that there is no requirement that the tariff—imposing43
country be large relative to world markets. As long as the foreign
seller is charging a price above marginal cost, and as long as it is
able to discriminate between the domestic market and other markets, it
will be possible for a tariff to lower prices.
In one extension of their analysis, Brander and Spencer go on to
consider the case where the foreign firm is attempting to deter entry
by a potential domestic competitor. They follow an early Dixit model
in which the incumbent firm does this by setting a limit output high
enough that if it were to be maintained post—entry this entry would be
unprofitable (this was before Dixit acquired enlightenment and became
perfect). The result in this case is that any tariff low enough that
the limit pricing strategy is maintained will be wholly absorbed by
the foreign firm.
Rent—shifting
Clearly a tariff can give domestic firms a strategic advantage in
the domestic market, in the same way that export subsidies can give
them an- advantage in foreign markets. Welfare assessment of strategic
tariff policy is however complicated by the need to worry about
domestic consumers. What Brander and Spencer (1984) point out,
however, is that rent shifting will generally reinforce rent
extraction. That is, if in the absence of domestic competitors a
tariff would be partly absorbed by foreign firms, the presence of
domestic competitors will reinforce the case for a tariff.44
Reducing marginal cost
In Krugman (1984a) it is pointed out that protection of the
domestic market can serve as a form of export promotion. The model is
a variant of Brander and Krugman (1983), where two firms
interpenetrate each others' home markets through reciprocal dumping.
Instead of constant marginal cost, however, each firm has downward—
sloping marginal cost. Suppose now that one firm receives protection
in its home market. The immediate result will be that it sells more
and the other firm less. This will reduce the home firm's marginal
cost, while raising its competitor's cost; this will in turn have the
indirect effect of increasing the Home firm's sales in the unprotected
foreign market. In the end, "import protection is export promotion":
protection of the home market actually leads to a rise in exports. The
same results obtain when the economies of scale are dynamic rather
than static, arising for example from R&D or a learning curve.
Is this policy desirable from the point of view of the protecting
country? We can surmise that it might be, because it is in effect a
strategic export policy of the kind with which we are now familiar. A
numerical example in Krugman (1984b) shows at least that such a policy
could be worth carrying out ——ifthere is no retaliation.
Promoting entry45
Venables (1985a) considers another variant of the Brarider—Krugman
model in which marginal cost is constant, but there are fixed costs.
This time, however, he allows free entry and waives integer
constraints on the number of firms. He now asks what the effects of a
small tariff imposed by one country would be.
It is immediately apparent that such a tariff would raise the
profitability of domestic firms and lower the profitability of
foreign, leading to entry on one side and exit on the other. This
makes the home market more competitive, and the foreign market less
competitive. What Venables is able to show, surprisingly, is that for
a small tariff this indirect effect on competition has a stronger
effect on prices than the direct effect of the tariff itself. The
price of the protected good will fall in the country that imposes the
tariff, while rising in the rest of the world!.
To understand this result, first note the first—order condition
for a firm's deliveries to each market:
px(dp/dx)=
wherex is the firm's deliveries to the market and c is marginal cost.
In a Cournot model dp/dx as perceived by the firm will be the slope of
the market demand curve, and thus will itself be a function of the
market price p. Thus x will be a function of p, as will the revenues
earned by the firm in that market.46
Since everything is a function of p, we can write the zero—profit
condition that must hold with free entry as a function of p and of p*,
the price in the foreign market. In Figure 14, the schedule HH
represents the combinations of p and p' consistent with zero profits
for a representative firm producing in Home, FF the zero-profit locus
for a firm producing in Foreign. In the presence of transport costs it
will ordinarily be true that HH is steeper than FF, i.e., Home firms
are relatively more affected by the Home price than Foreign firms, A
free entry equilibrium will occur when both zero—profit conditions are
satisfied.
Now suppose that a tariff is imposed by Home. The zero—profit
locus for Home firms will not be affected, but Foreign firms will face
increased costs on shipment to Home. They will have to receive a
higher price in at least one market to make up for this, so FF shifts
out. We now see Venables' result: the price in Home must actually
fall, while that in Foreign rises.
The welfare calculation is now straightforward. Profits are not
an issue, because of free entry. Consumers are better off in the
protecting country. And there is additional government revenue as
well.
Evaluation47
The new literature on 1-0 and trade certainly calls into question
the traditional presumption that free trade is optimal. Whether it is
a practical guide to productive protectionism is another matter. The
models described here are all quite special cases; small variations in
assumptions can no doubt reverse the conclusions, as was the case in
the Brander—Spencer mode1 of export competition.
It may be questioned whether our understanding of how imperfectly
competitive industries actually behave will ever be good enough for us
to make policy prescriptions with confidence. What is certain is that
purely theoretical analyses will not be enough. Until very recently,
there was essentially no quantification of the new ideas in trade
theory. In the last two years, however, there have been a handful of
preliminary attempts to put numbers into the models. I conclude the
paper with a discussion of these efforts.
QUANTIFICATION
Efforts to quantify the new theoretical models have been of three
kinds. First have been econometric studies of some of the aggregate
predictions of the intra—industry trade model described in the first
section of this paper. Second, and most recent, have been efforts to
"calibrate" theoretical models to fit the facts of particular
industries. Finally, and most ambitiously, Harris and Cox have48
attempted to introduce industrial organization considerations into
general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy.
Testing the intraindustry trade model
The empirical analysis of intra—industry trade, in such studies
as that by Grubel and Lloyd (1975), long predates the monopolistic
competition theory described in this survey. Without a theoretical
base, however, discussion of intraindustry trade often seemed
confused. Only once formal models became available was it possible for
empirical workers to concentrate on propositions derived from these
models.
Two studies focus on the most direct proposition, that the
proportion of intra—-industry as opposed to inter—industry trade should
be positively correlated with the degree of similarity between
countries' capital-labor ratios. Loertscher and Wolter (1980) use
differences in per capita income as a proxy for differences in
resource endowments, and confirm the correlation using a cross section
for a single year. Helpman (1984) uses a more extended data set to
confirm the proposition over a number of years; he also shows that as
the industrial countries became more similar over time the relative
importance of intra—industry trade grew, just as the model would
suggest.49
Havrylyshyn and Civan (1984) study a proposition that is less
clearly implied by the model, but in the same spirit: namely, that
intraindustry trade is likely to be more prevalent in the trade
between advanced countries than in trade among LDCs, on the
presumption that advanced Countries produce more differentiated
products. They find that this is, indeed, the case.
These regression studies suffer from a common problem of lack of
congruence between the data and the concepts in the theoretical model.
In the theory, an "industry" is a group of products produced with
similar factor intensities, so that trade within an industry cannot be
explained by conventional comparative advantage. Whether this concept
of an industry has anything to do with a three—digit Standard
International Trade Classification category —-theunit to which the
analysis is in each case applied ——isanybody's guess. What is clear
is that the data does not provide a very good correspondence to the
theorectical concept.
Calibrated models
The newest development in the 1—0/trade field is the attempt to
quantify models by calibrating them to data from actual industries.
This style of analysis seems likely to grow, and needs a name; f or now
we may call these studies Industrial Policy Exercises Calibrated to
Actual Cases (IPECACs).50
The pioneering work here is DIxit's (1985) model of the auto
industry. The US auto market is represented as a noncooperative
oligopoly, with foreign autos differentiated from domestic. Demand
functions are derived from other published studies; constant terms and
cost parameters are derived from actual industry data. In order to
make the model fit, Dixit is also obliged to adopt a conjectural
variations approach, with the conjectures derived in theprocess of
calibrating the model.
Once the model is calibrated, it is possible to perform policy
experiments on it. In particular, Dixit calculates the optimal trade
policy when a tariff is the only available instrument, and the optimal
trade—cum--industrial policy when a production subsidy is also
available. He finds that a modest tariff is in fact justified, forthe
reaons we described above. The gains from this optimal tariff are
however fairly small. When a production subsidy is allowed, the
additional role for a tariff is greatly reduced, with the gains from
adding tariffs as an instrument extremely small.
A model similar in spirit but quite different in detail is
Baldwin and Krugman (1986), which studies the competition in 16K
Random Access Memories. The model is a variant ofKrugman (1984a),
with strong learning-by—doing providing the increasing returns.As in
the Dixit analysis, the modelts parameters are partly drawn fromother
published studies, partly estimated by calibrating the model to actual
data. Also as in Dixit's study, it provesnecessary to adopt a51
conjectural variations approach in order to match the observed
industry structure.
In the Baldwin—Krugman analysis, the policy experiment is a
historical counterfactual. How would the competition in 16K RAMs have
been different if the Japanese market, which appears to have been de
facto closed to imports, had been open? The model yields a striking
result: instead of being substantial net exporters, the Japanese firms
would not even have been able to compete in their own home market.
Thus import protection was export promotion with a vengeance.
The welfare implications of this counterfactual can also be
computed. According to the model, Japanese market closure, although it
succesfully promoted exports, did not benefit Japan. Because Japanese
firms appear to have had inherently higher costs than their US rivals,
market closure was a costly policy that hurt both the US and Japan.
At the time of writing, the only other IPECAC is a study by
Venables and Smith (1986). They apply methods that combine those of
the Dixit and Baldwin—Krugman papers, as well as an interesting
formulation of multiniodel competition, to study the UK refrigerator
and footwear industries. The results are also reminiscent tosome
degree of both other studies: modest tariffs are welfare—improving,
and protection has strong export—promoting effects.
The calibrated trade models are all at this point rather awkward
constructs. They rely on ad—hoc assumptions to close gaps in the data,
and they rely to an uncomfortable degree on conjectural variations ——52
an approach that each of the papers denounces even as it is adopted.
To some extent the results of this literature so far might best be
regarded as numerical examples informed by the data rather than as
studies that are seriously meant to Capture the behavior of particular
industries. Nonetheless, the Confrontation with data does lend a new
sense of realism and empirical discipline to the 1—0/trade literature.
General equilibrium
The most ambitious attempt to apply industrial organization to
trade policy analysis is the attempt by Harris and Cox to develop a
general equilibrium model of Canada with increasing returns and
imperfect competition built in. This effort, reported in Harris (1984)
and Harris and Cox (1984), stands somewhat apart from much of the
other literature reviewed here. Although some elements of the
monopolistic Competition model are present, the key to the results is
the adoption of the Eastman—Stykolt pricing assumption, that firmsare
able to collude well enough to raise the domestic price to theforeign
price plus tariff.
Given this assumption, it is naturally true that Canadianimport—
competing industries are found to have excessive entry and
inefficiently small scale. The authors also offer a fairly complex
analysis of pricing and entry in export markets, which leads them to
believe that inefficient scale in Canadian export industries results53
from US protection. Combining these effects, the authors find that the
costs to Canada from its partial isolation from the US market are
several times higher than those estimated using conventional
computable general equilibrium models. Thus the Harris—Cox analysis
makes a strong case for free trade between the US and Canada.
The Harris—Cox study has not yet been followed by a body of work
that would enable us to evaluate the robustness of its conclusion. It
is unclear, in particular, how much the assumption of collusion—cum--
free entry is driving the results; would a noncooperative market
structure still imply comparably large costs from protection? It is a
fairly safe bet, however, that over the next few years workers in this
area will attempt to fill in the space between Harris—Cox and the
calibrated models, building more or less general equilibrium models
that also have some detailing of the process of competition in
individual industries.
Evaluation
The attempts at quantification described here are obviously
primitive and preliminary. However, the same could be said of attempts
to apply industrial organization theory to purely domestic issues. The
problem is that the sophistication of our models in general seems to
have outrun our ability to match them up with data or evidence. The
first efforts in this direction in international 10 are therefore54
welcome.One might hope that this effort will be aided by an
interchange with conventional 10 research that poses similar issues,
such as the analysis of the effects of mergers.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The rapid growth in the application of industrial organization
concepts to international trade seems to be remaking trade theory in
10's image. Traditional trade theory was, by the late 1970s, a
powerful monolithic structure in which all issues were analyzed using
variants of a single model. The new literature has successfully broken
the grip of that single approach. Increasingly international
economics, like industrial organization, is becoming a field where
many models are taught and research is an eclectic mix of approaches.
This transformation of the subject has been extremely valuable in
several ways. First of all, the fundamental insight is right ——
marketsare often not perfectly competitive, and returns to scale are
often not constant. Beyond this, the new approaches have brought
excitement and creativity to an area that had begun to lose some of
its intellectual drive.
At this point, however, the central problem of international
trade is how to go beyond the proliferation of models to some kind of
new synthesis. Probably trade theory will never be as unified as it55
was a decade ago, but it would be desirable to see empirical work
begin to narrow the range of things that we regard as plausible
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